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Abstract
This paper establishes a simple model of long run economic and political development, which is driven by
the inherent technical features of di¤erent production factors, and political conicts among factor owners
on how to divide the outputs. The main capital form in economy evolves from land to physical capital and
then to human capital, which enables their respective owners (landlords, capitalists, and workers) to gain
political powers in the same sequence, shaping the political development path from monarchy to elite ruling
and nally to full su¤rage. When it is too costly for any group of factor owners to repress others, political
compromise is reached and economic progress is not blocked; otherwise, the political conicts may lead to
economic stagnation.
JEL: O10, O40, P16, N10.
Key Words: Economic Development, Political Development, Class Structure, Land, Physical Capital,
Human Capital, Monarchy, Su¤rage Extension.
1 Introduction
At any time in human history, [t]he e¤orts of men are utilized in two di¤erent ways: they are directed
to the production or transformation of economic goods, or else to the appropriation of goods produced by
others. (Vilfredo Pareto, as quoted in James 1984, p. 63) Indeed, the main story line of human history,
Hirshleifer (1994) argues, may be driven by the balance between cooperative economic activities leading to
greater aggregate wealth, and political conicts over its distribution. This dichotomy seems to be a good
description of the relevant economics literature as well. One stream of studies emphasizes the e¤ects of
the former type of interactions on economic development. For example, Galor and Moav (2006) argue that
the complementarity between physical and human capital would eventually eliminate the class distinction
between capitalists and workers. The other stream of literature, in contrast, focuses on the political conicts
over income redistribution among owners of di¤erent factors (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2001, 2005).
Built on the new insights emerged from these two lines of research, the current paper tries to integrate
them to capture the organic links in-between. And in doing so, it delineates a long run coevolution path
of economic and political development as illustrated in gure 1. The accumulation of knowledge gradually
changes the composition of capital stock and imposes an evolutionary order upon the secular change of
political and economic institutions(North 1981, p. 208). As the main factor of production shifts from land
(before tk) to physical capital (between tk and th) and then to human capital (after th), the relative economic
and hence coercive powers of landlords, capitalists, and workers shift accordingly, inducing the transition
of political system from monarchy (before Tk) to elite ruling (of landowners and capitalists between Tk
and Th) and nally to democracy with full su¤rage (after Th). Every new political regime, by extending
political power to the owners of the new form of capital and thus increasing their future economic gains from
investment, speeds up economic progress. Such a smooth reinforcing coevolution path between economic
and political development may not always be realized; repression and economic stagnation could also happen
under certain conditions characterized in the model.
The main results of the paper are in general consistent with historical evidence. After the shift from
hunting and gathering to agriculture, the predominance of land in production lasted thousands of years.
As Cipolla (1976, p. 183) observed, until the nineteenth century the development of Europe, like that of
any other preindustrial society, was ultimately constrained by the availability of land.Gradually, industry
and service sectors replaced agriculture to become dominant economic activities, leading to the industrial
revolutions in the last half of eighteenth century (North 1981, p. 159). By the early twentieth century, the
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Figure 1: The Time Line of Economic and Political Development
modern concept of the wealth of nations emerged: It was that capital embodied in the people human
capital mattered.(Goldin 2001)
The correlation between the evolving composition of capital stock in economy and the corresponding
political regimes is also widely observed. The agrarian basis of Europes political order dates back to the
introduction of feudalism at the turn of the rst millennium.(Bertocchi 2006a). The ever growing economic
strength of capitalists and landlords enables them to demand political power from the king. In Britain, for
example, Parliament became more sympathetic and accessible to the aspirations of merchants, masters
and manufacturers, farmers and landowners after the Glorious Revolution in 1688 (OBrien 1994). The
English experience, argued by Moore (1966, p. 429), tempts one to say that getting rid of agriculture as
a major social activity is one prerequisite for successful democracy. In the second phase of the Industrial
Revolution, the importance of human capital in the production process increased (Galor and Moav 2006).
The rising human capital strengthened workerseconomic power, which eventually led to franchise expansion
in several European countries (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000). The causal link between the level of economic
development and political democracy is also conrmed by cross-national statistical analyses and comparative
historical research (Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens 1993). Most democracies today have industrialized
economies where human capital is the dominant capital form; in countries where natural resources are the
main factors in production, authoritarian political regimes are more likely to happen than democracy (Lipset
1959, Moore 1966, Huber et al. 1993, among others).
The paper is related to studies on long-term growth.1 North (1981) proposes a dynamic framework of
political economy and substantiates it by rewriting the Western history in its light. He recognizes not only the
inuence of technology advancement on political institutions, but also the e¤ects of political institutions on
1For a short survey of related literature, see Bertocchi (2006b) and studies cited there.
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future technological and economic development. In some sense, the current paper is an attempt to formalize
this dynamic framework in a simple model. It thus may shed light on the current debates on whether
technology or institutions are more important in long-run growth. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005)
argue that institutions are the fundamental cause of long-run growth, while Glaeser et al. (2004) demonstrate
that human capital is more fundamental than institutions. Both claims can be true in the chain of dynamic
interactions between economic fundamentals and political institutions, depending on which specic segment
one chooses to investigate. For example, among countries with similar institutional backgrounds (e.g. colonies
of the same mother country), the initial gap in economic fundamentals may become the ultimate cause of
their later divergence since institutions are often endogenously adopted (Engerman and Sokolo¤ 1997, Rajan
and Zingales 2006). On the other hand, between countries with similar initial human capital (e.g. North
and South Korea), di¤erent institutions caused by exogenous factors may account for their later economic
development gaps.
The paper also contributes to our understanding of su¤rage extension. In the model, franchise expansion
is driven by the increasing importance of human capital, which has two e¤ects: it shifts the balance of political
power in workersfavor, while on the other hand it also reduces the potential loss of elites since the total
outputs are larger after su¤rage extension. The conict of income distribution between the elites and workers
is the focus of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), while the mutually benecial aspect of franchise expansion
is proposed by Lizzeri and Persico (2004) and Llavador and Oxoby (2005) among others. Both views nd
support in historical evidence, as they should do, since they highlight two di¤erent but necessarily interrelated
aspects of the same process. Furthermore, our basic idea of linking human capital and su¤rage extension
is consistent with a range of related phenomena: The su¤rage was usually rst extended to skilled workers,
then to unskilled ones, and nally to women, strictly following the ranking of their human capital levels;2
in the U.S., the states with severe scarcity of labors extended su¤rage earlier and more broadly (Engerman
and Sokolo¤ 2005); the emergence of mass democracy often coincides historically with industrialization.
To the extent that the cooperative and conicting sides of human interactions are treated simultaneously,
the paper is connected with Grossman and Kim (1995) and Grossman (2002) among others. Our results
suggest that the cooperative side dominates history progress in the long run, though the conicting side may
change history paths for some time and often into the stagnant directions.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 the basic elements of the political economy model are
2 In Britain, for example, the su¤rage extension was to the middle class in 1832, to the urban working class in 1867, to the
agricultural labourer in 1884, and nally to women in 1919 and 1928.
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introduced. Section 3 presents the analysis of the model. Further discussions and related historical evidence
are collected in section 4. Some concluding remarks are o¤ered in the nal section.
2 The Political Economy Model
2.1 The Economy
Preferences. There are overlapping generations in the economy. Each individual lives for two periods,
childhood and adulthood, where generation t achieves adulthood in period t. They accumulate human
capital in childhood and participate in the production process in adulthood. Individuals are identical in
preferences, which are represented by a log-linear utility function
uit = (1  ) log cit +  log(Z + bit);
where cit is the adulthood consumption of individual i of generation t, b
i
t is the transfer to his o¤spring,  2
(0; 1) and Z > 0:3 The budget constraint is cit + b
i
t  Iit , where Iit is his income at adulthood. As a result of
utility maximization, the optimal bequest of individual i of generation t is
bit = maxf(Iit   Z); 0g:
Only when the productivity of an economy increases to the extent that someones income is higher than Z,
would there be any resources left as bequest. The total bequest in society is denoted by Bt, which can be
invested in either physical capital or human capital for the next generation.
Technology. In every period the economy produces a single homogeneous good that can be used for
consumption and investment. The production function at time t is
Yt = At(L+Kt)
1 Ht ;
where At is the knowledge stock, L the quantity of land that is xed overtime, Kt the quantity of physical
capital, and Ht the e¢ cient units of human capital. Both physical and human capital depreciate completely
after one period. The knowledge in society is accumulated through idle curiosity and learning-by-doing at
a speed of g > 0 so that At+1 = At(1 + g). This knowledge accumulation process would be the ultimate
growth engine in the economy.
3This type of utility function is used by Galor and Moav (2006) among others; the exact specications are not essential for
the qualitative results.
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The physical capital Kt+1 is produced by capitalists combining material resources mkt and knowledge
At+1. Its amount is also a¤ected by tax rate k;t+1 on capital returns. In specic, the physical capital
production function is
Kt+1 = K(m
k
t ; At+1; k;t+1); (1)
where K3 < 0, K33  0, K13  0, and K(0; At+1; k;t+1) = 0 meaning that a positive amount of material
mkt > 0 is needed to produce any physical capital.
To acquire human capital above the basic level, workers have to make costly e¤ort which decreases in
the tax rate h;t+1 imposed on wages. The amount of material resource devoted to public education is mht ,
where mkt +m
h
t  Bt holds. The human capital production function is
ht+1 = h(m
h
t ; At+1; h;t+1); (2)
where h3  0, h23  0, h33  0; h1(0; At+1; h;t+1) =  <1; and h(0; At+1; h;t+1) = 1: The last condition
means that even without any education expenditure, a worker is endowed with the basic human capital
(normalized to one unit) in the form of basic intellectual abilities and physical strength, as long as the wage
is not below the subsistence level w0: The aggregate amount of human capital at time t is Ht  Ntht where
Nt is the number of workers and ht the units of human capital per worker.
Note the three factors of production have di¤erent technical features: Land is exogenously given by nature
and di¢ cult to be created or destroyed. Physical capital, in contrast, has to be produced with endogenous
e¤ort and material investment, and it is easier to lose value if conscated. These features also apply to
human capital investment beyond the basic level that is endowed by nature. As the analysis will show,
the complementarity among these three capital forms in production and their distinct technical features co-
determine the sequence of the economic development path in gure 1, while the exact timing is also a¤ected
by institutional elements such as the political structure discussed below.
Demographic Structure. There areNL landowners andNC capitalists, which are few in the population
and xed over generations. The initial endowment of land among landowners is exogenously given and then
passed on to their children, so is the ability of capitalists to generate physical capital. Landowners and
capitalists participate in production using their assets rather than direct producing skills. The majority are
workers who supply only human capital. Following Hansen and Prescott (2002), the worker population Nt is
set to be consistent with the broad demographic trends in history, where the supply of raw labors keeps the
real wage at the subsistence level w0, while the worker population becomes constant once costly education
5
starts at th.4 That is,
Nt =
(
( w0At)
1
(1 ) (L+Kt) if ht = 1;
( w0Ath)
1
(1 ) (L+Kth); if ht > 1:
(3)
2.2 The Political Structure
The division of products among the three groups of factor owners (landowners, capitalists, and workers) is
determined by the political system, where the ruling group may exploit ruled agents through taxes and con-
scation. The political structure of the society is ultimately shaped by the relative economic and bargaining
powers of the agents.
We make two assumptions on the establishment and transition of political regimes. The rst assumption
is essentially might-is-right : the ruler group is composed of agents who have dominant violence potential
than the ruled agents. This is in line with Norths (1981, p. 21-22) theory of state where the key to
understanding the state involves the potential use of violence to gain control over resources. (...) The
contract theory assumes an equal distribution of violence potential amongst the principals. The predatory
theory assumes an unequal distribution.We take a more general approach, assuming the coercive ability of
a group is determined by its collective economic power and organizing e¢ ciency.
In specic, suppose the violence ability vti of an individual i at period t is proportional to his income
Iit where vti = $I
i
t with $ 2 (0; 1): The collective coercive power of a group G of individuals is vG =
 (G)
P
i2G$I
i
t , where  (G) 2 [0; 1] denotes the organizing e¢ ciency of the coalition. It is reasonable to
assume  (G) decreases in the group size G due to free-riding and information problems, where  (1) = 1 is
a special case for a single member group. When two groups ght, the one with a higher coercive power can
always defeat the other, where the cost is equal to the violence level of the defeated group; if they have equal
coercive power, each wins with a probability one half.
The initial political regime is established based purely on might-is-right, where the dominant group be-
comes the rst ruler. The dynamic economic development, however, would constantly shift the relative
economic and hence coercive powers of groups, and eventually pose threatening challenges to the old po-
litical order. There are three possible actions for the incumbent ruler, namely, Not Repress, Repress, and
Compromise. If the incumbent ruler does nothing (i.e., choosing Not Repress), the challenging group would
become the new ruler by might-is-right. To preserve its political dominance, the incumbent ruler may thwart
the economic progress to curb the growing economic/coercive power of ruled agents (i.e., choosing Repress).
This leads to our second assumption, namely, the incumbents advantage, since the ability to repress (or,
4An endogenous account for such demographic changes is in Galor and Weil (2000).
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in general, to modify the economic development course) increases the incumbents bargaining power in the
political game. Such an advantage is not without limit, however, since repression does not come cheap: the
rulers incomes are reduced because the economy would not produce at its full potential, and extra costs
are to be incurred to maintain its ruling since an underdeveloped economy would induce domestic unrest
and invite outside invasions from strong neighbors. The repression cost t > 0 is determined at each period
t by the degree of political competition from both within and outside the country, where t  F () with
support [; ]. When Compromise is chosen, political power is shared between the incumbent ruler and the
challenging group, assuming the challenging group can make credible commitment to share political power
even after they gain dominant economic power in the future.
Incumbent Ruler
Incumbent Ruler
Challenging Group
Compromise
Compromise
Repress
Not RepressRepress
Reject
Figure 2: The Political Game between Incumbent Ruler and Challenging Group
Consistent with the horizon of economic decisions in the overlapping generation model, the length of an
individuals adulthood, which corresponds to one period in the model, is also used as the horizon for political
decisions. This implies the ruler would not take any preemptive repressing actions in peaceful time when
the balance of coercive power is in its favor, and the ruled group has no alternative but to obey the current
political order.5 In a crucial period when the political regime would have changed based on might-is-right,
the incumbent ruler and the challenging group play a political game illustrated in Figure 2. Faced with
the potential challenge, the incumbent ruler moves rst by choosing Compromise or Repress. The game
5Due to the extremely long period (often in the magnitude of hundreds of years) the model covers, it is not realistic to
assume agents can take into consideration of all the future economic and political changes when they make decisions. For
example, Moore (1966, p. 30) observed that it is unlikely that more than a very few people had any but the haziest notions
as to ... what kind of a society might lie over the horizon.Allowing longer horizons and strategic options such as preemptive
repression may alter the timing but not the qualitative results of the transition process.
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ends if the ruler selects Repress since in the beginning of this period it still has dominant power. When
Compromise is chosen, the challenging group moves next, choosing to accept the proposed compromise or
reject it. When compromise is accepted, the game ends; if Reject is selected, the incumbent ruler moves
in the last step deciding between Repress and Not Repress. The exact payo¤s and subgame perfect Nash
equilibria are discussed in the next section. If mutual compromise is reached in equilibrium, the economic
progress and political transition will proceed as in Figure 1; if not, repression, economic stagnation, and
invasion may happen, which are not uncommon in history.
3 The Economic and Political Development
3.1 Land and Monarchy: [0; tk]
The Economy. The initial state of our model economy corresponds to a time when agriculture is the
dominant production method, and people are not educated. The productivity is so low that no saving is
available for capital accumulation; the capitalists are thus not distinguishable from the worker group. Such
a situation will continue until period tk (determined below in (5)), which means ht = 1 and Kt = 0 in any
period t 2 [0; tk]:
A landlord i owns land Li and employs Nti workers at wage wt, where
PNL
i=1 Li = L. His revenue is
ti  maxNti At(Li)1 Nti   wtNti, where the optimal labor demand is Nti = ( wtAt)
1
1 Li. Given the
labor supply Nt in (3), the subsistence wage level w0 clears the labor market. So a landlord with land Li
earns a prot
ti = A
1
1 
t Li; (4)
where   (1  )( w0 )

1  . The aggregate prot  =
PNL
i=1 ti = A
1
1 
t L grows at the same rate g
1
1  as
the worker population Nt = ( w0At)
1
(1 )L; while the wage is xed at w0: So the per capita output remains
roughly constant over time, around Nt + w0 =
w0
 :
The Political Game among Landowners. Initially there is no incumbent ruler, so the political game
is determined completely by the rule of might-is-right, where landlords decide whether or not to grab the
land of others by violence. Since by assumption the land is not destroyable, a landlord i by defeating another
landlord j in the beginning of period t would get the latters land that yields prot tj , while incurring a
cost of $tj equal to the violence level of j; so the net gain is (1 $)tj > 0.
Let 
 be the set of all possible coalition that can be formed among landowners, and G 2 
 a generic
element of the set. The following proposition shows that monarchy emerges as the political regime in
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equilibrium where the king owns the largest piece of land.6
Proposition 1 (i) When land is the only capital, a monarchy is a political equilibrium immune to coalition:
The king is the biggest landowner who owns land LM , where LM > maxG2
f (G)
P
i2G Lig, and imposes
a tax rate of at least 1 $ on the other landlordsprots; the distribution of land ownership is stable. (ii)
The rst period the society starts to have surplus is
tk =
(1  )
ln(1 + g)
(lnZ(A0)
 1   lnL); (5)
where L  LM + (1 $)(L  LM ); tk arrives earlier when LM and 1 $ are higher.
Proof. The monarchy is indeed an equilibrium since there are no protable deviations. No coalition is
able to challenge the king given the land distribution, since the coercive power is proportional to ones prot
and hence to land size. The king would not grab other landlordslands since the tax rate 1 $ yields the
same amount of revenue as doing so. The landlords would accept the tax because they get no benet from
ghting either as an individual or as a group. The landlords would not ght each other because the net
benet of doing so is at most zero: By grabbing another landlord js land, one can get an after-tax prot
not higher than $j , which equals the ghting cost he has to incur.
The kings total income TtM includes land prot tM and tax revenue (1 $)
P
i 6=M ti:
TtM = tM + (1 $)
X
i 6=M
ti = A
1
1 
t L;
where the second equality follows (4). Since tk is the earliest possible period that a society starts to have
positive bequests and the king is the richest person, Ttk;M = Z must be true, which leads to (5). It is obvious
that tk decreases in LM ; L, and 1 $.
This proposition implies that the property rights of land are secure in the monarchy system, thanks to
the overwhelming power of the king who protects the petty landowners for taxes. The aggregate outputs are
also the highest since no resources are wasted in ghting each other over land ownership, and the taxes are
not distorting given that the total land size is xed and no investment is feasible yet. The monarchy also
facilitates economic development, since the high inequality of land ownership often shortens the time for a
6The violent potential of workers is not important now for three reasons. First, there is nothing to grab from a worker who
already accepts the subsistence wage w0. Second, there is no gain for workers to help any landlords in ghting since they always
get the same wage w0 no matter which landlord they are working for, given the aggregate labor supply. Third, workers are
unable to challenge landowners as an individual and as a group due to their low income and low coalition e¢ ciency associated
with the large number of them. Even if workers succeeded in getting all the lands, the equilibrium land distribution would not
change from that described in the proposition. So workers would stay out of political games until after th when human capital
investment starts.
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society to start investment in other forms of capital. As Cipolla (1976, p. 32) observed, In a predominantly
poor society lacking corrective means (...), a high concentration of wealth is an indispensable condition to
the formation of saving.From these aspects, the monarchy is an appropriate or e¢ cient political regime
when land is the only capital. This may explain why throughout history, individuals given a choice between
a state however exploitative it might be and anarchy, have decided for the former.(North 1981, p. 24)
3.2 Physical Capital and Elite Ruling: (tk; Tk]
With surplus available in society after tk, capitalists start to produce physical capital instead of working as
raw labors.7 Since producing physical capital requires special skills of capitalists, the king cannot get much
value by conscating their factories if the capitalists do not operate them; and physical capital is much easier
to be hidden or destroyed by their owners, the capitalists, than land. To capture these insights, we assume
conscation brings less value to the king than imposing taxes on capital returns. The endogenous supply of
physical capital marks its fundamental di¤erence from land; it reinforces the cooperative aspect and down
plays the conicting side of the relationship among factor owners. Such a change in economic arena will
induce corresponding adjustments in the political system, where the political power is to be shared.
3.2.1 Physical Capital Accumulation
Capitalists borrow material resources from the king and rent the physical capital back to him at a market
rate rt, while paying the king at a tax rate kt on capital returns. When the borrowing cost is positive,
the return rate rt can be interpreted as the net rate earned by capitalists; without loss of generality, we
normalize the borrowing cost at zero.
The choice sequence in each period t is as follows. The king rst announces kt; then capitalists produce
physical capital Kt = K(mkt 1; At; kt), taking as given rt; kt and m
k
t 1 = Bt 1 = (
T
t 1;M   Z);8 and
nally the king decides his demand for capital and labor. The capital return rate rt and wage w0 clear the
capital and labor markets in equilibrium. The optimal choices are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The optimal tax rate k;t on capital returns is uniquely determined by Kt + 

ktK3 = 0 for
t 2 (tk; Tk) under monarchy. It maximizes the kings total revenue TtM = A
1
1 
t (L+ ktKt). The physical
capital stock Kt = K(Bt 1; At; kt) increases over time.
7The assumption that capitalists do not emerge from landowners is consistent with historical evidence; see Doepke and
Zilibotti (2005) for a plausible explanation.
8For simplicity we model the aggregate supply of physical capital in a reduced form rather than deriving it from individual
behaviors. The king would nd it optimal to invest only in physical capital at this time period; see proposition 3 for the formal
proof.
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Proof. In the appendix.
The ever increasing physical capital stock induces faster growth in the total output A
1
1 
t (L + Kt)
and worker population, while the per-capita output is still roughly constant at w0 as before. The king
benets from the process of capital accumulation through increased tax revenues. The economic development,
however, would gradually build up pressure to challenge the absolute power of the king. Measured by before-
tax revenues, the total economic power of the elites (the capitalists and landlords), A
1
1 
t ((L LM )+Kt),
grows faster than the kings A
1
1 
t LM ; and so does their coercive power.
3.2.2 The Political Game Between the King and Elites at Tk
Suppose period Tk is the rst time when the elites would have the same coercive power as the king. Then
Tk is uniquely determined by  (NC +NL  1)A
1
1 
Tk
((L LM )+KTk) = A
1
1 
Tk
LM , which boils down to
KTk = (
1
 (NC +NL   1) + 1)LM   L: (6)
At the beginning of period Tk when the king still has slightly dominant coercive power, the elites and the
king play the political game in Figure 2. The king can use his incumbent advantage to repress the challenge
by stagnating the economic and hence the coercive power of the elites. For example, he can freeze the
physical capital stock at certain level K < KTk by directly conscating their assets or spending his savings
in non-productive ways (say in religion, arts, or jewelry) than lending them to capitalists. The kings income
with Repress is
r  ATk
1
(1 ) (L+ k;TkK)  Tk ;
where k;Tk is the optimal tax rate, and Tk is the repression cost at period Tk:
If a compromise is reached where the king and the elites share political power and impose zero tax on
land and physical capital, the kings income shrinks to his land prot
c  A
1
(1 )
Tk
LM :
If the king chooses Not Repress, the elites would gain the ruling power at the end of period Tk based on
might-is-right and conscate the kings land or impose a tax rate 1  $ on it (by proposition 1). The net
income of the king with Not Repress is
n  $ATk
1
(1 )LM = $c:
Note the king is always better o¤ choosing Compromise than Not Repress since c > n holds due to
$ < 1; and both are independent of the repression cost Tk . Whether Repress is a better choice for the king
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depends on how costly the repression is, since r strictly decreases in Tk . The comparison between the
three outcomes n, c and r is illustrated in gure 3.
repression compromise no repression
nq qcqq
nP
cP
rP
Figure 3: The Incumbent Rulers Incomes and Repression Cost 
Lemma 2 There exist two unique levels of repression costs c and n; where c < n, such that r > c >
n for Tk 2 [; c), c > r  n for Tk 2 (c; n], and c > n > r for Tk 2 (n; ].
Proof. In the appendix.
For the elites, compromise is better than repression since under compromise the economic progress is not
blocked and they pay no tax; and the case of no repression is even better since they get extra tax revenues
from the Kings land.
Proposition 2 The Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in the political game between the king and elites at
period Tk is (Repress, Repress; Compromise) when Tk 2 [; c), (Compromise, Repress; Compromise) when
Tk 2 [c; n], and (Compromise, Not Repress; Reject) when Tk 2 (n; ].
Proof. When Tk < c, the king would repress capitalists since r > c > n holds by lemma 2. When
Tk 2 (c; n], the king would choose to repress if his proposed compromise is rejected since r  n; given
the kings strategy, the elites would accept the compromise; then the king would choose to compromise in
the rst place due to c  r  n. So (Compromise, Repress; Compromise) is the SPE for Tk 2 [c; n].
When Tk > n the king would choose Not Repressafter the compromise is rejected since r < n; knowing
this the capitalists would reject the compromise proposed by the king, and the SPE is (Compromise, Not
Repress; Reject).
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The proposition suggests mutually benecial compromise can be reached only when the repression cost
is in the middle range; when the repression cost is low, repression and economic stagnation are more likely
to happen, and when it is very high, no-repression happens and the king loses his political power to the
challenging group. All three cases have historical examples.
In Europe the contest for power is the routine : an appropriate degree of rivalry among states may put
pressure on the sovereign to decentralize power and provide political foundations for secure markets in order
to enlarge the tax base and the future military capabilities of the system.(Alston et al. 1996, p. 129) So
in general their repression costs are in the middle range. Among European countries, the heavy reliance on
navy for military power and hence less capacity for domestic repression may be one reason that the king
and elites in England achieved compromise, compared with repression in the continental countries such as
France and Spain (Skocpol 1973).
Where there are no strong rivals from competing states or potential rulers within his own state, the
repression cost tends to be quite low and hence the existing ruler characteristically is a despot, a dictator, or
an absolute monarchy.(North 1981, p. 27) This is likely to happen when a kingdom is isolated geographically
from others, or the neighbors are much weaker, such as in China or Egypt: Ecumenical empires did not
fear ight, especially when, like China, they dened themselves as the center of the universe, the hearth
and home of civilization, and everything outside as barbarian darkness. There was no other places to go.
(Landes 1998, p. 36) Similarly, Egypt was isolated by desert and water from invaders and was not overrun
until (...) at the end of the twelfth dynasty. (North 1981, p. 95) The repression may continue for a long
time until outside threats dramatically increase the repression costs and turn it into the no-repression case,
where the incumbent is forced to yield political power to the challenging group. As globalization increases
and the international political environment becomes more competitive, the possibility of repression is likely
to go down.
Since the main interest of this paper is the long run coevolution path of economic and political devel-
opment, we focus on the smooth case of Tk 2 [c; n], where the landlords and capitalists would share the
political power and there is no income tax on them from period Tk onwards.
3.3 Human Capital Investment and Full Su¤rage: [Tk; Th]
During the initial periods under elite ruling, workers are still raw labors and paid the subsistence level of
wage w0. Only when the physical capital stock is large enough would public education starts; the rst period
when this happens is th, from then on human capital investment starts. The worker wages, however, still
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remain at w0 until period t0h > th when the disincentive of low wages on human capital accumulation is
big enough, and they may never rise to the competitive levels under elite ruling due to concerns of political
stability. But eventually, the elites will have to face the political challenge of workers as their human capital
and wages continue to increase.
3.3.1 Wage Tax and Education Expenditure
Since human capital investment involves costly inputs and worker e¤ort, the supply of educated workers
becomes limited. In specic, it is assumed constant at the level of Nh  Nth as in (3), where th denotes the
rst period when human capital investment starts under the elite ruling. Given the labor supply Nh, the
competitive wage level
wt+1 = At+1(L+Kt+1)
1 (Nhht+1) 1
would clear the labor market. The actual wage for workers at period t+ 1 is
wt+1  (1  h;t+1 )wt+1;
where h;t+1 2 [ ;  t+1] is the implicit wage tax rate set by the ruling elites. The upper bound  t+1  1  w0wt+1
guarantees the lowest wage w0; which allows workers to maintain living at the subsistence level. The lower
bound
  1   (NL +NC)
 (NL +NC) +  (Nh)
1

(7)
arises from the political concern: The aggregate income of workers is (1   h;t+1 )wt+1Nhht+1 = (1  
h;t+1 )Yt+1, while the income of elites is (1    + h;t+1 )Yt+1. To prevent the workerscoercive power
from being high enough to challenge the ruling of elites,  (Nh)(1   h;t+1 )Yt+1   (NL + NC)(1    +
h;t+1 )Yt+1 must hold, which is equivalent to h;t+1  .
Note  > 0 must be true if workers earning competitive wages can ever become dominant; but this implies
h;t+1  > 0 so that workers under elite ruling cannot get the full competitive wage wt+1. On the other
hand, h;t+1 cannot be too high, otherwise workers are less willing to make e¤ort in accumulating desirable
skills and hence their productivity would be low.
Suppose the elites rst choose public education expendituremht and then the wage tax h;t+1 : To capture
the idea that the disincentive of tax on wages increases over time, h2+(1 +)h23 < 0 is assumed. The
optimal solutions are described in the following proposition.
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Proposition 3 mht and 

e;t+1 are uniquely determined under the elite ruling:
mht
(
= 0 for t < th;
> 0 for t  th; where @m
h
t
@Bt
> 0;
h;t+1
8><>:
=  t+1 for t+ 1 < t0h so that wt+1 = w0;
2 ( ;  t+1) for t+ 1  t0h; where @

h;t+1
@At
< 0;
=  for t+ 1 = Th;
where Tk < th < t0h < Th, all of which are uniquely determined.
Proof. In the appendix.
This lemma suggests that only when the surplus Bt becomes large enough would investment in human
capital starts at period th; before then only physical capital is accumulated.9 And when the stock of
knowledge is not high enough, the human capital is not very responsive to workerse¤ort so that workers
are still paid the subsistence wage w0 in t 2 [th; t0h] as before, even after human capital investment starts. A
direct implication is that when human capital is not important in production or when worker e¤ort is not
essential for human capital investment, the elites will set the optimal wage at w0. This is consistent with w0
being the wage level under monarchy.
3.3.2 The Political Game Between Elites and Workers at Th
As the human capital stock goes up and wages continue to increase, the collective coercive power of workers
also grows. It will eventually match that of the elites in period Th, when the optimal tax rate h;Th reaches
the lower bound  : The political game between the elites and workers at period Th is the same as that
between the king and the elites, where full su¤rage obtains and workers earn competitive wages wt+1 if
compromise is reached. With similar arguments as in section 3.2.2, we get the following results.
Proposition 4 There exist two unique levels 0c and 
0
n; where 
0
c < 
0
n, such that the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium in the political game between elites and workers at period Th is (Repress, Repress; Compro-
mise) when Th 2 [; 0c), (Compromise, Repress; Compromise) when Th 2 [0c; 0n], and (Compromise, Not
Repress; Reject) when Th 2 (0n; ].
Proof. In the appendix.
9This justies our earlier assumption that only physical capital was invested under monarchy when the total surplus was
even smaller.
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3.4 A Smooth Development Path: Summary
If the repression costs remain in the middle ranges at both transition times Tk and Th, a smooth economic and
political development path is likely to be taken, where new production potentials are realized by adjusting
political institutions accordingly. England seems to be such a case, where political compromises were reached
in these crucial moments. The smooth evolving path of this type of political economy is summarized by the
following proposition.
Proposition 5 When the repression costs are in the middle range where Tk 2 [c; n] and Th 2 [0c; 0n] such
that compromises between the incumbent ruler and the challenging group are reached, the political economy
would evolve as follows. Physical capital accumulation starts at period tk while human capital investment
starts at th; the per capita output stays constant before th and starts to increase afterwards. Monarchy is the
political equilibrium before period Tk, then its replaced by elite ruling of landlords and capitalists, and nally,
workers are also granted political rights and hence full su¤rage is realized after period Th. The time path
tk < Tk < th < Th suggests that economic development leads to political transition, which in turn facilitates
future economic development.
This fast-track economic and political development is the one illustrated in gure 1. During this process,
the population of workers grew at the same rate as the total output (with faster growth rates when physical
capital accumulation started after tk) so that the per capita output was constant before human capital
investment started at th, after which the per capita output began to increase while the population stayed
the same. After Th, all factor owners gain political power and earn competitive returns, which enables the
economy to produce at its full capacity.
Roughly speaking, most OECD countries have experienced all the developmental stages and are now be-
yond Th. Many countries, however, are not so lucky as this benchmark path shows; when mutually benecial
political compromise is not reached, the economic progress is often stagnated by political repressions. On
the other hand, not every country has to go through every developmental stage described in the model, due
to various elements such as wars, colonization, and transnational economic activities. So our simple model
paints only a broad brush picture of the long run development path, which is driven mainly by the techni-
cal features of di¤erent factors in production and political conicts among self-interested factor owners on
dividing the outputs. That said, the model is actually less restrictive than it appears, since many elements
(such as cultures, religions, ideologies, racial concerns, and international environment), though not explicitly
modeled, may implicitly a¤ect production functions and repression costs.
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4 Historical Perspective and Further Discussions
This section gathers some historical evidence trying to convince the reader that the simple model analyzed
above is relevant and useful in organizing our thoughts on long run economic and political development.
Our discussions below mainly focus on the history of Western Europe (esp. Britain) where the full time line
suggested in the model has been realized, and political compromises were reached timely enough to avoid
economic stagnation.
Land, Anarchy, and Monarchy. From the beginning of settled agriculture, about eight thousand
years past before the peak of the Roman Empire. After the fall of the Roman Empire in the fth century up
to the year 1000, Europe was stagnate in income and population. The introduction of feudalism in the 9th
century enabled Europe to gradually emerge from the anarchy and develop a political-economic structure
which produced su¢ cient order and stability to in turn induce changes leading to its breakdown (...).(North
1981, p. 124)
Since land is di¢ cult to destroy in ghting, it has been the main target of endless ghts and wars in
centuries. The property rights of land are better protected in a monarchy system where the king uses
his dominant coercive power to provide security for petty landlords in exchange of taxes. While the ten
millennia since the creation of settled agriculture appear in historical retrospect as an endless saga of war
and of butchery, exploitation (however dened), enslavement, and mass murder, most often done by the state
ruler or his agents, it is still essential to stress the necessity of a state for economic progress. Throughout
history, individuals given a choice between a state however exploitative it might be and anarchy, have
decided for the former.(North 1981, p. 24)
The link between land size and coercive power is observed by Smith ([1776] 1976, p. 408): The security
of a landed estate (...) depended upon its greatness. To divide it was to ruin it, and to expose every part
of it to be oppressed and swallowed up by the incursions of its neighbors.Later, the growth of a money
economy made the link between economic power and coercive power even more close: The size of a kings
army now depended on his purse.(North 1981, p. 136)
Physical Capital and Elite Ruling. When income and population started growing, it is possible to
accumulate wealth and invest in physical capital. As a result, industry and service sectors gradually replaced
agriculture and became the dominant economic activities. During this transition process, the aristocracy
as a group did not contribute to industrialization, and remained attached to the landed estates as its only
source of wealth (Bertocchi 2006a, Doepke and Zilibotti 2005).
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The ever growing wealth of capitalists made it possible to gain political power from the king. A very
important instance of convergent interests between major segments of the landed aristocracy and the upper
ranks of the town dwellers occurred in Tudor and Stuart England.(Moore 1966, p. 424) This is an important
condition leading to the compromise between the king and elites, which caused an early removal of feudal
rights but at the same time allowed the aristocracy to retain economic and political control (Bertocchi
2006a). After the Glorious Revolution in 1688, a succession of ministries (...) managed to create political
conditions which turned out over time to be conducive to British dominance of world trade in manufactures
and international services,although these actions should in no sense be interpreted as a strategyfor the
long-term development of the British economy.(OBrien 1994)
Wages, Human Capital, and Su¤rage Extension. In the same time, however, workers still received
very low wages as before. Under Elizabeth and Stuart statutes (which remained unreformed between 1688 and
1815) the state retained very considerable powers (...) to determine wages and conditions of employment.
(...) Such statutes and the common law (...) strengthened the authority of employers and depressed wages.
(OBrien 1994) Indeed, workers living standards showed no clear progress before 1820. (Lindert 1994)
The value of human capital in the production process was still limited in the rst phase of the Industrial
Revolution, when workers developed skills primarily through on-the-job training, and child labor was highly
valuable. Its importance increased in the second phase, when workerse¤ort also became a crucial element
a¤ecting rmsproductivity; this prompted a sequence of education reforms in England since the 1830s,
designed primarily to satisfy the increasing skill requirements (Galor and Moav 2006).
Not surprisingly, after 1800, employers in Lancashire soon found that they need more than a labor
force that was available. They needed a labor force that was loyal, reliable, and motivated. To insure this
they paid wages that soon became institutionalized as fair wages(...). (Huberman 1986, 1991, 1992, as
cited in Mokyr 1993, p. 91) Consistent with our assumption of the link between wage and worker e¤ort,
Lazonick (1994) argued that the contribution of workers to superior economic performance depends on their
attitudes. Workers will only expend high levels of e¤ort in the production process if they expect to receive
what they consider to be a fair share in the consequent returns. However, due to intense competitive
pressures, employers are often unable to make credible promises to workers that their shares would be fair.
By giving workers the assurance that their expectations for rewards would be met, collective organization
made workers more willing to contribute high levels of e¤ort to production. Eager to generate output
for sale while there were prots to be made, employers became receptive to sharing power with workers
organizationsrather than ghting unionization.
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The increasing value of human capital shifted the power balance more favorable to workers, making their
threat of violence a signicant factor in shaping the franchise expansion. In Britain, the motive to pass the
First Reform Act in 1832 for su¤rage extension was to avoid social disturbances, which seems to be the
consensus amongst historians. For example, Lang (1999, p. 36) concludes that the level of unrest reinforced
the case for immediate reform now, rather than later: it was simply too dangerous to delay any longer. Just
as Wellington and Peel had granted emancipation to avoid a rising in Ireland, so the Whigs (...) should
grant reform as the lesser of two evils.
On the other hand, the increasing importance of human capital also brought benets to elites and hence
made compromise more appealing than before. The employersacceptance of collective bargaining in turn
opened the way for political transformations (...). In the eyes of the British political elite of the 1860s
and 1870s the advent of cooperative industrial relations under the aegis of business-minded union leaders
transformed craft workers from uncontrollable subversive into responsible citizens. One result was the 1867
extension of the right to vote to the better-paid of the workers (Lazonick 1994). After several further
extensions of su¤rage, full democracy was nally realized in Britain in 1884 for men and in 1928 including
women.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper establishes a simple model on the coevolution path of economic and political system, which is
driven by the inherent technical features of di¤erent factors in production and the political conicts among
factor owners in output distribution. The dynamic economic progress transforms the main capital form in
economy from land to physical capital and then to human capital, which enables their respective owners
(landlords, capitalists, and workers) to gain political powers in the same sequence. When it is too costly for
any group of factor owners to repress others, political compromise is reached and the economic progress is
not blocked; otherwise, political conicts may lead to repression of some factor owners and hence economic
stagnation.
A main insight emerging from the paper is about the compatibility of economic and political development,
which brings a developmental perspective into the discussions of appropriate or growth-enhancing political
institutions. For instance, the paper suggests when natural resources are the main factor in production,
imposing democracy may induce anarchy and stagnation; an alternative way is to help accumulate physical
and human capital. Only when human capital becomes the dominant production factor in the economy,
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which often happens after a society has a large enough physical capital stock, would a political democracy
be more likely to sustain itself and to facilitate further economic development.
On the other hand, many elements in society such as religions, cultures, geography, and history may
inuence development by a¤ecting the costs of political transition. For example, the willingness to make
political compromise may greatly facilitate economic progress. As Mokyr (2005) argues, by the middle of the
eighteenth century Britain had that most elusive yet decisive institutional feature that makes for economic
success: the exibility to adapt its economic and legal institutions without political violence and disruptions.
Britains great asset was (...) that its political institutions were nimbler, and that they could be changed at
low social cost (...).In contrast, one can imagine that in societies where people are conditioned to blindly
obey authority, the institutions are more rigid and di¢ cult to change from within. In this aspect, the intense
global competition in both political and economic terms, by increasing the outside threats to ine¢ cient
economies, may lower the feasibility of repressive political regimes and hasten the development process.
The framework of the current paper may prove useful in understanding related long run development
issues. For example, the changing motivation, formats, and frequency of wars over time may also reect the
shifts of capital stock composition. If democratic countries are necessarily highly invested in human capital,
which is often true, it is not surprising that they seldom wage wars at each other: What is the point of
conquering a nation whose main wealth is human capital? The relevant parties could have been better o¤
by engaging each other in peaceful international trade. The evolution of education system, in terms of both
contents and nancing methods, may also be shaped by similar driving forces.
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APPENDIX
Lemma 1.
Proof. We solve the kings decision problem from the last step, where his objective function is
tM (kt) = max
NtM ;Kt
At(LM +Kt)
1 NtM   wtNtM   rtKt:
The kings demand for labor is NtM = (

wt
At)
1
(1 ) (LM +K

t ); while the other landlordsdemand is still
the same as before: Nti = (

wt
At)
1
(1 )Li for landlord i. So the total labor demand equals the labor supply
Nt = (

w0
At)
1
(1 ) (L+Kt ) when wt = w0.
The optimal solution for physical capital is rt = (1   )At(LM + Kt) (NtM ) = A
1
1 
t ; where
  (1   )( w0 )

1  : Note the market rate of capital return rt is independent of land size and physical
capital stock. The kings prot from his land, after plugging NtM and rt; is tM = A
1
1 
t LM ; which
depends only on his land size and not on the physical capital used. This would also be true for the other
landlords when they have positive bequests. That is, any landlords prot is independent of the physical
capital used and hence independent of the tax rate k;t imposed on capitalists. Without loss of generality,
we assume the demand for physical capital is equal to its supply.
The total income of the king Tt;M = A
1
1 
t (L + 

ktKt) includes land prot plus tax revenues from
land and physical capital. It depends only on the aggregate amount, not on the distribution, of either land
or physical capital. So it would remain the same after the other landlords and the capitalists start to have
positive bequests some periods later. The FOC Kt+ ktK = 0 yields the unique optimal tax rate 

k;t since
the SOC 2K + ktK < 0 is satised.
The physical capital stock Kt = K(Bt 1; At; kt) increases over time since
@Kt
@Bt 1
= K1 +K
@kt
@Bt 1
 K1   1
2
(K1 + K1) =
1
2
K1   K1 > 0;
where the rst inequality obtains from K
@kt
@Bt 1
= K (K1+K1) 2K K =
K1+K1
 2 K=K 
(K1+K1)
 2 given that
 K=K  0.
Lemma 2.
Proof. Conditions c  r and r  n can be simplied to, respectively,
Tk  A
1
(1 )
Tk
(L+ k;TkK   LM )  c;
Tk  A
1
(1 )
Tk
(L+ k;TkK   $LM )  n:
It is straightforward to see that c < n.
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Proposition 3.
Proof. The objective function of the elites is
e;t+1 = max
h;t+1
(1  + h;t+1 )At+1(L+Kt+1)1 (Nhht+1);
taking as given mht ; ht+1 = h(m
h
t ; At+1; h;t+1 ), and Kt+1 = K(Bt  mht ; At+1; 0). The FOC w.r.t. h;t+1
is
ht+1 + (1  + h;t+1 ) @ht+1
@h;t+1
= 0 if h;t+1 2 [ ;  t+1]; (8)
h(mht ; At+1; ) + (1  + )
@h(mht ; At+1; )
@h;t+1
< 0 if h;t+1=  ; (9)
h(mht ; At+1;  t+1) + (1  +  t+1)
@h(mht ; At+1;  t+1)
@h;t+1
> 0 if h;t+1=  t+1: (10)
The assumption h2 + (1  + )h23 < 0 implies the LHS of the above three expressions all decrease in At
since h;t+1  . The inequality in (10) holds until period t0h when (8) holds at equality, h;t0h =  t0h , which
uniquely determines t0h. For the interior solutions,
@h;t+1
@At+1
=
h2 + (1  + h;t+1 )h23
 SOC < 0
holds based on (8); so the optimal wage tax h;t+1 decreases in At+1, until it drops to the lower bound  at
period Th, which is uniquely determined by h;Th =  .
Taking as given h;t+1 (mht ); the FOC for m
h
t is
(L+Kt+1)h1   (1  )ht+1K1 = 0 if mht > 0; (11)
(L+Kt+1)   (1  )K1  0 if mht = 0; (12)
where h1(0; At+1; h;t+1 ) =  and h(0; At+1; h;t+1 ) = 1 are substituted in (12). For interior solutions we
have
@mht
@Bt
=
K1h1   (1  )ht+1K11
 SOC > 0
based on (11). So the LHS in (12) also strictly increases in the total surplus Bt, and it would eventually
arise to zero at certain period th, after which human capital investment starts. th is thus dened by (12) at
the equality. When th  Tk, human capital investment starts under elite ruling; this is indeed the case when
the capital stock at Tk; KTk in (6), is still small.
Proposition 4.
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Proof. At the beginning of period Th; if the elites freeze the economic power of workers at a level
Y  YTh 1, they get an income
0r  (1  + h;t+1 )Y   Th ;
where Th denotes the repression cost. If a compromise is reached where workers are allowed to share political
power, each group gets its competitive returns with h;t+1= 0 afterwards. The elites then get
0c  (1  )Y (mhTh 1; ATh ; 0):
In this case the total output is maximized at the social optimal level.10
If the elites do not repress, workers would get exclusive political power after period Th. For simplicity
suppose workers impose a uniform tax rate Th on both landowners and capitalists to maximize their income
(+ Th(1 ))Y (mhTh 1; ATh ; 0), where Th is uniquely determined by L+Kt+ (+ Th(1 ))K = 0:
Then the elites would get
0n  (1  Th)(1  )Y (mhTh 1; ATh ; 0) = (1  Th)0c;
which is smaller than 0c (note the education expenditure is not a¤ected by 

Th
).
Conditions 0c  0r and 0r  0n can be simplied to, respectively,
Th  (1  + h;t+1 )Y   (1  )Y (mhTh 1; ATh ; 0)  0c;
Th  (1  + h;t+1 )Y   (1  Th)(1  )Y (mhTh 1; ATh ; 0)  0n:
0n > 
0
c is due to 
0
n < 
0
c, or equivalently 

Th
> 0: Similar to Lemma 2, there exist two unique levels 0c
and 0n; where 
0
c < 
0
n, such that 
0
r > 
0
c > 
0
n holds for Th 2 [; 0c), 0c  0r  0n for Th 2 [0c; 0n],
and 0c > 
0
n > 
0
r for Th 2 (0n; ].
The challenging group, workers in this case, always prefer no repression to compromise, and compromise
to repression. The fundamental features of this game are similar to that between the king and elites. The
equilibrium results follow directly from the proof of proposition 2.
10The implicit assumption is that the total bequest in society is not reduced by the transition of political regime, which
requires workers to have positive bequest at least from period Th. When this is not true, the elites have more incentives to
repress workers and hence may delay the transition, while the main results still hold.
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